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From a certain point of view, the relation between the 
study of the human mind and the philosophical field that, 
ever since Baumgarten’s “baptism” in the 18th century, we 
have been used to call “aesthetics” is as old as philosophy 
itself. For example, it may perhaps sound thought-provoking, 
but at the same time it is true, that it is possible to find 
Aristotle’s “aesthetics” – in the original meaning of a theory 
of perception, referred to the etymology of the word deriving 
from the Greek aisthesis – more in his work Peri Psychēs (De 
Anima) than in his work Peri poietikês (De Poetica). And it is 
also uncontroversial that, for example, Kant’s aesthetics – or, 
more precisely, his transcendental foundation of a critique of 
the aesthetic power of judgment – rests, as far as its general 
significance is concerned, on his broader analysis of all the 
faculties of the human mind (faculty of cognition; feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure; faculty of desire) as connected to 
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the specific faculties of cognition (understanding; power of 
judgment; reason), and must be properly contextualized in 
such an analysis of the human mind, as nicely explained in § 
IX of the Introduction to his third Critique.  
At the same time, however, it is also certainly true 
that the growing and seemingly unceasing 
“compartmentalization” and ”specialization” of human 
knowledge, especially in the last two centuries, has 
progressively led aesthetics and the philosophy of mind (like 
all other philosophical sub-disciplines, of course) to somehow 
establish themselves as autonomous and, in a sense, separate 
fields of inquiry, with little or no communication between 
them: a process, the latter, that probably has also been 
favored by the primacy, in the last centuries, of a quite 
narrow conception of aesthetics that only defined it as the 
philosophy of the Fine Arts and thus confined “the aesthetic” 
in the realm of “the artistic”. Anyway, although this process 
has probably been characteristic of the main part of the 20 th 
century, over the past few years it has been possible to 
observe how aesthetics and some new theories of the mind 
have been not only crossing paths again but also increasingly 
benefitting from each other in terms of an expansion of their 
foci and scope. Yet, just like in any newly established (or, 
say, newly re-established) relationship, misunderstandings 
and shortcomings are always possible, and it is not an easy 
task to “make things work”, when certain “old habits” still 
prevail – like that, as we said, of limiting aesthetics only to 
the philosophical interpretation of works of so-called High Art, 
and of considering aesthetics and the philosophy of mind as 
autonomous, separate and non-communicating fields of 
investigation. 
In this context, we consider it intriguing and 
stimulating to observe how Giovanni Matteucci’s recent book 
Estetica e natura umana. La mente estesa tra percezione, 
emozione ed espressione (Carocci editore, Roma 2019) 
ambitiously aims to bring together on the same ground – 
namely, a study on human nature – the tenets of the two 




fields of research mentioned above, and to show that things 
are actually easier than they seem, so to speak. This 
“easiness”, though, comes about only after having built a very 
complex and articulated path addressing both consolidated 
and recent, more original conceptions, both traditional and 
unconventional, challenging views. The path outlined in the 
book Estetica e natura umana and some recent articles by 
Matteucci is aimed at re-establishing the continuity that 
exists between various aspects and modalities connoting 
human experience: a continuity, the latter, that according to 
Matteucci has been undermined by a centuries-long dualistic 
philosophical attitude towards human nature as such.  
On this basis, we thought it stimulating for scholars of 
philosophy, for readers of “Meta” and for the author himself, 
to put his original philosophical conception to the test, so to 
speak, by planning and organizing a book forum with some 
questions asked by distinguished philosophers of our time 
working on both aesthetics and the philosophy of mind, and 
with the detailed replies provided by Matteucci. The 
complexity underlying Matteucci’s recent philosophical 
research is thus attested, beside his writings, by the wide-
ranging questions raised by the discussants involved in this 
Forum: Simona Chiodo, Roberta Dreon, Shaun Gallagher, 
Tonino Griffero, Jerrold Levinson, Claudio Paolucci, Richard 
Shusterman. The topics and problems called into question by 
each of them, according to their specific competence, span 
from the relation to the traditions of pragmatism and 
phenomenology to enactivism, from the question of aesthetic 
properties to the role of the body in aesthetic experience, 
from the relation between perception and language to 
technology, just to mention a few of them. In our view, as 
editors of this book forum, the discussants’ questions and the 
replies provided by the author ultimately prove how 
flourishing, rich and full of potential, also for further 
discussion, this field of research currently is.  
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Précis of the research: Aesthetics and Human Nature: 
Extended Mind and “Experience-with” 
 
Giovanni Matteucci 
University of Bologna 
 
This book forum revolves around a volume published in 
Italian (Matteucci 2019a) and other related essays in English 
(Matteucci 2018, 2019b, forthcoming) whose main concern is to 
describe aesthetic experience in its characterizing aspects. This 
topic is approached in the light of some positions that have 
emerged recently in various fields, primarily concerning theories 
of the mind and evolutionary studies. These are stances that are 
strongly incompatible with the traditional schemes through 
which human experience in general has been described for a long 
time (and still often is described). Such recent approaches seek to 
overcome an underlying dualist approach that has been 
consolidated since Cartesian modernity. In this regard, the 
thesis I advocate is that the aesthetic is a privileged test bed for 
this overcoming, given the peculiar relational character that is 
nested in it and that too often is instead neglected.  
The implications of this neglect are manifold. On the one 
hand, the lack of an in-depth study of the interactional nature of 
the aesthetic leads those who carry out empirical investigations 
on this experiential modality to reductively equate its scope with 
a culturally compromised artisticity, precisely in an era like ours 
in which the very notion of art itself seems to have entered a 
crisis to the point of almost losing a great part of its exemplary 
function. Today the aesthetic is experienced largely and 
meaningfully far beyond that secluded cultural sphere which for 
two centuries has been seen as its ideal territory. Hence the 
impression of asphyxiated circularity that derives from 
neuroscientific researches that aim at defining the specificity of 
aesthetic experience through lab investigations in which subjects 
are exposed to objects that are presumed to have a univocal and 
unquestionable artistic status, while it is actually hardly more 
than conventional. On the other hand, the persistence of a 
certain faithfulness to schemes drawn from the modern 




gnoseological dualism seems to be a decisive obstacle preventing 
aesthetics from actually accepting in its agenda issues deriving 
from new conceptions of the mind and human nature that are 
implied by the most recent studies in cognitive sciences and 
evolutionary studies. They are in fact schemes that at most try to 
restore only downstream the relational tenor of the aesthetic, de 
facto sterilizing its operative efficiency. 
Against this neglect, I try to discuss some elements that, 
in my view, can contribute to overcome the traditional 
paradigm according to which the human experience must be 
traced back to a contrasting relationship between the horizon of 
subjectivity and the horizon of objectivity. I refer to this 
traditional paradigm with the formula “experience-of”, since it 
equates every experiential interaction, even the aesthetic one, 
with a cognitive relation in the strict sense of an agent, i.e. the 
bearer of experience, to a content that is external and extraneous 
to her/him. Among the many corollaries of this paradigm are the 
subordination of the description of aesthetic experience to the 
description of cognitive experience, and therefore the focus on 
issues related to judgment, representation, evaluation, etc., i.e. 
all forms in which we could say that the experience of an object 
by a subject takes place. Relevant implications of this paradigm 
are views of perception, emotion and expression that are 
projected onto the aesthetic on the basis of their conformity to 
cognitive needs, at most measuring the gaps between them and 
these standard needs. The result is, however, the concealment of 
the peculiarities of the aesthetic, as if its purpose was to serve 
knowledge and conceptual thought, perhaps in order to disclose 
some new or unprecedented horizons. 
I therefore contrast the paradigm just mentioned with a 
very different one, which I refer to with the formula 
“experience-with”. According to this conception, experience is 
first of all a situated interaction, involving an organism and its 
surroundings, endowed with its own structures and modes of 
meaningfulness already for how it develops in sensible textures. 
Aesthetic processes are accordingly understood as immersive 
practices that do not primarily serve to define or categorize but 
rather to perceive and feel, not to formulate theories about the 
world but rather to carry out the environmental interaction. 
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This is how I try to describe the complex articulating of the 
practices of perceiving, (emotional) feeling, and expressing as a 
development of that organism’s condition of intimate 
involvement in the material processes in which the surrounding 
environment unfolds. I refer to this “material engagement” (see 
also Berleant 2000 and Malafouris 2013) with the notion of 
“collusion”, aiming to indicate that one is implicated in an 
experiential arc as a vector of a field, according to the metaphor 
of the game or ludus from which also the “allusion” (the 
character of invitation to the game that the field has with its 
connotations) and the “illusion” (the constrained moving about 
within the field, the playing along with the latter) derive.  
In order to emphasize in the most powerful way the 
peculiarities of this paradigm, especially in comparison with the 
traditional one, my argument often accentuates the reasons for 
their contrast. However, the traits which on the theoretical 
level thus contrast two different paradigms, on the experiential 
level must be considered as pairs of terms between which a 
relationship of mutual indeterminacy must be established. 
They are poles of dynamic distinctions (starting from couples 
such as thematic-operative, predicative-antepredicative, 
judgment-perception, propositional-expressive, etc.). Indeed, 
nothing excludes that all these cases are about mutually 
irreducible elements that nevertheless persist over the same 
domain and that therefore complement and sustain each other 
in the concreteness of the phenomena. 
The emphasis on the specific aspects connoting this 
paradigm is aimed at clarifying a fact that I consider essential. 
It seems to me that precisely in these praxes of aisthesis and in 
these practices of the aesthetic, in fact, the coupling between 
organism and environment that qualifies the human mind as 
enactive (rather than contemplative), embodied (rather than 
spiritualized), embedded (rather than abstract) and therefore 
extended (rather than intracranial), surfaces in a “primitive” 
way (in the sense of something which is underivable from 
something else). In the aesthetic device Homo sapiens finds – so 
to speak – a prototypical dialogical partner that makes it that 
cooperative and “collusive” being that also supports its ability to 
design a knowledge and experience of the world, but that first 




of all makes it co-evolving with its own ecological niche and 
unavoidably jointed with the latter. 
The aesthetic is therefore understood here as that 
particular dimension in which the human being is trained to 
have an experience “with” the world before an experience “of” it. 
Insofar as they are aesthetic, this is what so-called works of art 
disclose. What happens when, while reading a novel, we 
intensely savor the emotions of the narrated scenes yet without 
personally feeling them, or when, while listening to a piece of 
music, we follow a meaningful enveloping texture that cannot 
be formulated with clarity and distinction in propositional 
terms? In such cases we find ourselves immersed in a dynamic 
field of expressive correspondences which is populated by vectors 
that overwhelm us the more we feel them as “our own”. In such 
situated interaction, that is, we take part expressively, without 
however being able to claim that we are the ones who 
cognitively govern what happens despite the fact that we are 
clearly actively engaged in it. The contents of the environment 
operate as an integral part of that same mind which we also 
feel we belong to. It is an extended mind, which we carry out by 
enacting its expressive potential.  
If understood in this experiential sense, the paradigm of 
the extended mind thus finds in the aesthetic the evidence it 
needs to lose the character of a metaphysical assumption that 
many of the critiques raised against it have been based upon. 
The aesthetic turns out to be a primitive occurrence of that 
“parity principle” that is the kernel of the extended mind, since 
this principle is felt and directly practiced in it. It almost plays 
a role of a “sensible” guarantor of the inseparability of mind 
and world claimed by the cognitive paradigm of the extended 
mind: as an experience “in the flesh” of a primary coupling, the 
aesthetic can offer that felt evidence without which the 
extended mind is reduced to either a metaphysical ambition or 
an exhausted metaphor. Yet, this applies as long as we conceive 
of the aesthetic not as a property or a state, but as a relational 
modality, i.e. in its “adverbial nature”, which makes it elusive 
every time one attempts to determine its specific function, 
especially from a cognitive point of view. 
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This approach is tantamount to amending the model of 
the extended mind from its canonical functionalist connotation 
and takes on a distinctive enactivist characterization, which is 
articulated in structures that possess “performative and 
operative nature”. In other words,  
the mind is extended when it is aesthetic. Irreducible to mere 
functionality, the aesthetic primitively expresses the experiential 
(and not the ontological) cell of our mind, of which it is hence a factor 
of extension, an “extensional functor”’ between organism and 
environment: it appears when the organism feels itself both active 
and passive by participating in an environment which it feels as 
equally active and passive in a unitary, at least possible, horizon of 
sense. In musical terms, it is a cadenza shared between soloist and 
orchestra in which, in every single moment we cannot but sense how 
boundaries, established roles are porous and evanescent. Something 
creative, apparently: as an extended mind Homo sapiens dwells on 
this aesthetic threshold, forced by its own nature to creativity 
(Matteucci 2019b, 179-180; cf. 2019a, 57-58).  
On the other hand, the undeniably at least 
intersubjective status of the aesthetic suggests that the latter 
cannot be reduced to mere subjective contingency. Therefore, 
it’s either one thing or the other. It could be per se a cognitive 
content that can be determined thematically, but then we 
should show how this cognitive determination could take place, 
while modern aesthetics has actually failed in doing this, both a 
parte subiecti and a parte obiecti. Otherwise, it should be 
understood as a potentially transversal factor with respect to 
human experience, which in some cultural contexts is elevated 
to a content that can also be cognitively determined, for 
example as artistic. The adoption of the model of the extended 
mind in an enactivist sense through the paradigm of the 
experience-with seems to me a way to take the second path. The 
first step is to recognize how – experientially – the root of the 
extension of the mind has (at least: also) a primitive aesthetic 
character, that is, not derivable from the cognitive dimension 
but not necessarily foundational with respect to it.  
In this analysis aesthetic experience proves to be 
“perceptualization” rather than “conceptualization”: a way to 
make perceive and sensible, an acting through explorative 
orientation, rather than a way to categorize and judge. This has 
led me to take an analytical-material approach, investigating 




processes that immanently constitute the praxis of aisthesis so 
to speak horizontally, without assuming layers or levels 
hierarchically arranged on a vertical axis, both top-down and 
bottom-up. One way in which I characterize this approach is by 
saying that it tends to be phenomenological, and thus alternative 
to the various and more or less explicit forms of transcendental 
criticism and of empiricism that are often prevailing today and 
that, in my opinion, fail in grasping the primitive collusiveness of 
the extended mind as experience-with. 
My research therefore moves within apparent 
boundaries and may even appear incomplete and lacking 
compared with what is normally expected from an aesthetic 
theory. It is not primarily concerned with evaluation, pleasure, 
representation, definition of art, etc., that is, with a great part 
of the content of the current agenda of aesthetics. The reason 
for this absence is that I believe that those issues become 
preconditions for the aesthetic discourse only on the basis of the 
option, which I counter, of the unilateral adoption of the 
experience-of paradigm. If anything, I rather think that we 
should address these issues starting from the aesthetic 
practices that I have tried to describe.  
Recurrent topic of the research, then, is the comparison 
between the prevailing antepredicative and non-judicative, or 
sub-judicative, mode of experience in aisthesis and the one that 
prevails in the field of knowledge and conceptual determination, 
that is, judicative propositionality. Also in this case, the 
distinction should be understood as a dynamic polarization, and 
not as a relationship between straightforwardly alternative 
planes. The difference is between the dense, thick texture and 
the discrete, thin configurations of the same experiential 
interaction. It is possible to observe all this as reflected in the 
analysis of aesthetic utterances, in which linguistic, predicative 
and propositional forms are used outside their canonical 
function to express the “overall” (non-atomic, “internal” or 
nuclear) content of the sensible interaction between the 
organism and the environment. Such a phenomenon somehow 
summarizes the main features of the experience-with 
specifically differing from those of the experience-of, showing 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – XII (2) / 2020 
602 
 
how the aesthetic constitutes a field of tension through which 
nature becomes human for Homo sapiens. 
The expression “human nature” takes on a special 
meaning here. It does not denote the essence, or essential 
endowment, of a particular entity, but rather the way in which 
Homo sapiens shapes itself in the exploratory relationship with 
its own world, so as to translate the environmental setting it 
interacts with into something extensively “own”, contributing to 
the co-evolution of its ecological niche. Human is that nature 
that integrates itself into the extended mind because the 
organism and the surrounding environment that immanently 
emerge from their correlation equally belong to it. In other 
words, human is that nature potentially enacted thanks to 
aesthetic-expressive devices that are established within the 
“material collusion”. The model of the extended mind, then, 
leads to an extended conception of human nature itself. 
I am extremely grateful to the various colleagues who 
have paid attention to my work by participating in this book 
forum. Their questions encouraged me to go deeper into aspects 
that are useful to critically test the perspective that I have tried 
to outline. The questions raised are often intertwined, and I 
apologize in advance, should some of my replies be repetitive. 
Moreover, some elements of my colleagues’ rich questions could 
not be addressed in my replies. Going into further details and 
considering a number of further implications would have 
required the formulation of theses and arguments far exceeding 
what was suitable for this context. 
I asked the editors of this book forum to arrange the 
questions and my replies by following the alphabetical order of 
the discussants’ names, but with one exception. The question 
that will be considered at the end, in fact, requires an open 
perspective, as it were, that is particularly useful for a non-
definitive conclusion and therefore for a sort of re-opening of the 
discourse that I was able to develop in the texts considered here. 
Finally, I would like to sincerely thank the journal 
“Meta” and its editors for welcoming the idea of this book 
forum, and, with particular fondness, I would like to thank 
Gioia Laura Iannilli and Stefano Marino for having organized 
and edited it. 





Questions to Giovanni Matteucci 
 
Roberta Dreon (Cà Foscari University of Venice) 
Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis) 
Tonino Griffero (University of Rome “Tor Vergata”) 
Jerrold Levinson (University of Maryland) 
Claudio Paolucci (University of Bologna) 
Richard Shusterman (Florida Atlantic University) 
Simona Chiodo (Polytechnic University of Milan) 
 
 
1. Roberta Dreon to Giovanni Matteucci 
Giovanni Matteucci’s book Estetica e natura umana 
(2019a) presents a rich theory of the aesthetic in human 
experience, connecting at least three major strands of inquiry: the 
legacy of John Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics, phenomenological 
theories about perception and the relation between experience 
and judgment, and recent debates in post-cognitive science, 
eventually supporting a radical view of the mind as embodied, 
embedded, enacted, and extended. 
Influenced by Dewey, Matteucci’s basically favors an 
anti-subjectivist and anti-dualist idea of experience that he 
labels “experience-with” and contrasts with the more 
traditional view that he calls “experience-of”. Very roughly, the 
latter conception is based on the opposition between two kinds 
of entities, a subject and an object, and considers cognition as 
the pivotal relation in order to connect the two poles; by 
contrast, the former conception gravitates around an 
organism’s embedment within an environment, which the 
organism itself belongs to and interacts with rather than 
simply standing before reality and its objects. By adopting a 
reframed conception of experience of this kind, Matteucci 
conceives of the aesthetic as a mode of experience where the 
“material engagement” and the profound “collusion” of the 
perceiver within a perceptive field is intensified and becomes 
manifest (or expresses itself) by exhibiting its usually 
functional structures (Matteucci 2019a, 48). Consequently, 
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artistic practices and experiences – such as, for example, 
reading a novel or carefully listening to a musical piece, almost 
being absorbed by it – represent cases of stronger and self-
manifesting entanglement and “collusion”, rather than the sole 
and exhaustive objects of aesthetic theory. A third pivotal claim 
of the book is that aesthetic perception and aesthetic feeling are 
the two practices by which the holistic structures of an 
experience become explicit without being objectified – at least, 
this is how I understand the author’s words. 
Given this general theoretical framework, I find 
Matteucci’s proposal stimulating on many levels. 
First of all, if the peculiarity of the aesthetic features in 
experience do not properly consist in embedment, “collusion” or 
material engagement, but are constituted through the coming 
into appearance of this very structure of experience, one cannot 
state that experience is pervasively aesthetic (Matteucci 2019a, 
48). In the case of more cognitively oriented interactions, such 
as formulating a judgment, they do not primarily focus on an 
experience as a whole; rather, they require an analytical 
working out and breaking up into discrete units of the whole of 
“experience-with”, although they derive from the latter. This is 
even the case with habitual actions and behaviors, where 
everything works as usual and no obstacle interrupts the 
interaction: for example, when I am riding a bicycle, my 
practical collusion with the bike and with the street that I am 
crossing does not come in the foreground. Of course, when I 
enjoy riding my bike with my family on a Sunday morning, I 
focus on the specific integration of my experience, but this case 
is different from that of using my bike to reach the train station 
and go to work. 
One further point deserving attention concerns the 
practical or enactive meaning of “aesthetic perception”, 
considering that it is conceived as a mode of perception that 
consists of making the aspects of an “experience-with” manifest 
without translating them into a predicative form. 
One related question regards a clarification of the 
intertwined relation between aesthetic perception and feeling in 
“experience-with”. How are they connected? Are they mutually 
conditioning aspects of an “experience-with”, or are they 




abstracted elements of a primarily affective perception that one 
can only differentiate later and for the sake of theory? 
Beyond these specific questions, my main interest lies in 
the following issue: is there any space and role left for cultural 
naturalism in Matteucci’s theory of the aesthetic in experience, 
that is, a form of non-reductive naturalism characterizing both 
Pragmatism and Enactivism, as well as Phenomenology (at 
least in Merleau-Ponty’s approach)? Although the author 
mentions organic-environmental interactions as the core of 
“experience-with” at the beginning of the book, later the 
Husserlian notions of perceiver and field of perception seems to 
prevail, and it remains unclear how the author’s conception of 
the aesthetic is related to life within an environment. 
In other words, how should we understand the aesthetic 
as a manifestation of the basic “collusion” characterizing 
human experience connected with struggling, moving, and 
acting in the natural and naturally cultural space that is the 
peculiarly human world? And where is the place of language to 
be found, given that the human niche has developed not only 
aesthetically but also through language? Can propositional 
judgments be assumed as the standard for linguistic practices 
and, consequently, still be opposed to aesthetic perception and 
feeling? I wonder whether a number of linguistic interactions, 
in turn, could be better understood as forms of collusive, 
materially entangled “experience-with”. What I have in mind 
here are the kinds of practices studied by anthropologists, 
developmental psychologists, and evolutionary linguistics, that 
have come to focus on language as a means to build and 
maintain bonds, share attention, make things in common and 
pursue purposes, share pleasure and suffering, and that function 
in a formulaic and holistic fashion, rather than analytically. 
I think that, although Matteucci once states that 
aesthetic perception and language are at least co-primitive 
(Matteucci 2019a, 60), a more flexible approach to language 
than the one supported by Husserl’s treatment of judgment 
could better support the kind of natural continuity toward 
which all three of his inspiring intellectual traditions tend. 
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Giovanni Matteucci: Reply to Roberta Dreon 
I am grateful to Professor Dreon for providing an 
accurate synthesis of the theoretical framework of my research. 
In particular, Dreon is right to say that a “pivotal claim” of my 
proposal is that “aesthetic perception and aesthetic feeling are 
the two practices by which the holistic structures of an 
experience become explicit without being objectified”. I would 
add, in this regard, that the non-objectifying explicitation at 
stake here is tantamount to the operative texture of experience 
becoming conspicuous and striking, according to a spectrum 
that goes from saliency to blatancy, in phenomena that 
populate a complex field spanning everyday life and 
spectacularized aestheticization. 
In the central passages of her contribution, Dreon calls 
attention to some points that I find converging on an equally 
important issue: the peculiarity of the aesthetic and its 
characterization with respect to ordinary experience. This is a 
question that is also raised by other contributions, and which in 
fact is transversal in relation to my research. In fact, if one 
describes aesthetic experience while dismissing any specific 
content determination, doesn’t the aesthetic end up coinciding 
with experiencing in a vague and generic sense? 
In my opinion, the inderivability from specific contents, 
whether they are specific properties of the object or specific 
states and attitudes of the subject, shows that the aesthetic 
consists in a peculiarly relational connotation. To put it very 
briefly: aesthetic is in the first place neither an objective 
content one has experience of, nor a subjective content that one 
assumes when having experience of something; aesthetic is, 
rather, a way in which the interaction between organism and 
environment is established, in which subjective and objective 
polarities emerge primitively in an expressive correspondence. 
It is in this sense that I recognize an operative dimension to the 
aesthetic. “Operative” is understood here in a phenomenological 
sense, as that which acts in the constitution of a phenomenon 
without being thematically identifiable and yet in an 
indispensable way. As a matter of fact, it does so in such a way 
as to lose its processual and institutive peculiarity at the very 
moment in which it is translated into a thematic content. From 




a positive point of view, it could also be said that – just like the 
aesthetic – what has an operative nature always eludes any 
definition and determination that one may attempt to provide 
of it, by demanding that a further processuality be carried out 
and that, once determined and thus fixed, would turn out to be 
an empty shell.  
It is in this sense I maintain that the aesthetic is 
pervasive with respect to experience as a whole. In 
paraphrasing a passage in which I state this (Matteucci 2019a, 
48), Dreon omits the adverb “potentially” that is actually 
decisive for me (“As a particular relational modality, the 
aesthetic is [at least potentially] pervasive…”). In fact, I believe 
that the potential/actual nexus is very useful to describe the 
relationship between operative and thematic that I have in 
mind in my characterization of the aesthetic. The operative 
components are characterized by the way in which (how) they 
are staged or enacted. Consequently, “aesthetic” is not the 
perception of something peculiar, but it is the perceptual praxis 
whose constitutive operativity saturates the scene, i.e. when 
what prevails over any functionalization is the expressive 
correspondence in which one finds oneself entangled in the 
experience with the environment. That such a “collusion” can be 
found in every real perceptual act, although according to 
different degrees of actuality/potentiality, does not seem to me 
an argument that proves my thesis wrong. Rather, it 
strengthens it: everywhere human experience takes place, a 
potential significance is presumed to precede any dichotomous 
relationship, any denotative meaning. The latter is reached, if 
anything, when the material collusion is aimed at a 
determination. But then the collusive elements flow back into a 
merely tacit operativity, to allow room for a thematic and 
cognitive configuration. Thus perceiving becomes ascertaining 
or recognizing and is no longer exploring. The thematic, 
therefore, does not inhabit a different world than the operative. 
It is a journey through the same territory that requires 
segmentation according to particular syntactic configurations. 
It makes discrete what operates as material density within a 
mere sensible manifestation.  
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The other side of the coin is that the aesthetic always 
appears on the verge either of flowing back into tacit 
operativity or ending up in thematic determinations. It always 
seems to be on the verge of disappearing, as everyone who 
pondered the fragility of beauty knows well. This is very 
important in order to describe the dimension that Western 
culture has attributed to the Fine Arts over the past three 
centuries. In that dimension, thematic contents (religious 
beliefs, philosophical ideas, properties of materials and forms, 
psychical contents and so on) are anything but irrelevant. But 
all these contents have an aesthetic sense to the extent that 
they sustain the course of the manifestation without making 
the thematization they carry with them prevail. Therefore there 
can exist a non-aesthetic art, in which the thematizing and 
conceptual (or even ideological) gesture surmounts the sensible 
exploration. When, instead, art is aesthetic, in a poem – as has 
been authoritatively observed – even the copula “is” no longer 
holds the value of a copula, and yet still keeps its efficacy. 
As I would say also in response to the second part of the 
last issue tackled by Dreon, just like any human artifice, 
language is an ancipital device. Besides being a functional tool 
for cognitive determination when it plays a mainly denotative 
role, it is well known that language also unfolds expressive 
power in its aesthetic performativity. The last chapter of my 
book (Matteucci 2019a, 201 ff.) therefore traces language back 
to an expressive praxis of aisthesis, of which it is perhaps the 
most complex form. In that context, I thus speak of “elocutory 
enunciation” (Matteucci 2019a, 239-243) precisely to illustrate 
this performative capacity of the language to perceptualize, 
which runs parallel to its capacity to conceptualize. By virtue of 
it, even propositionally packaged contents, so to speak, can 
preserve or take on aesthetic force when they support the 
course of an experience-with. And here it doesn’t even make 
sense to ask the question of the distinction between nature and 
artifice. By participating in an extended mind, Homo sapiens 
embodies its own nature through the artifice, it realizes its own 
biology through its own culture. Its ecological niche are the 
expressive devices that the human organism is materially 




engaged with. It is a whole texture of expressive 
correspondences, which “environs” the human being. Human is 
a nature that acts as a device, which is enacted in its 
significance before being identified with its meanings. The 
power that language has in establishing social bonds, recalled 
by Dreon, is due to a co-operativity that implies this 
collusiveness having an aesthetic matrix. 
That is why I insist on the historical-material dimension 
of the apriori as a texture in which expressive practices are 
sedimented. In this sense, I emphasize how aisthesis 
expressively inheres not in a “matter” but rather in a 
“material”, which “bears the signs of cultural elaboration, the 
sensory partitions, the relics of discarded grammars that are 
recycled as syntactic components, the sedimentations that co-
constitute a form of life as an aesthetic niche, i.e., the vestiges 
that human nature manifests: the material and historical 
apriori of the extended mind” (Matteucci 2019a, 205). It is no 
coincidence that, rather than merely speaking of “perception”, I 
opt for the formula of “perceptual praxis”, or even of perception 
as a “praxis of aisthesis”, as to accentuate its pertaining to the 
form of life that, in my opinion, is shared even by language in 
its perceptual performance, or of expressive perceptualization, 
as I would also say with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception and Prose of the World. On the 
other hand, I do not rule out the possibility that such a 
conception of the material-historical apriori involves a revision 
of Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt. The latter seems to me to be 
much more than a pre-scientific common sense. It is interwoven 
with expressive practices and the related know-how that every 
propositional articulation of experience presumes. Thus, the 
key notion of expressiveness allows a double amendment, of 
both perception and language, since it recognizes in both of 
them aesthetic (or vital, one might say) praxes that operate in 
the material correspondence of a situation (Dewey) and a form 
of life (Wittgenstein). 
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2. Shaun Gallagher to Giovanni Matteucci 
Professor Matteucci addresses a number of complex 
questions about the aesthetic. I want to focus on the specific 
issue of aesthetic experience. I endorse Matteucci’s proposal to 
characterize the aesthetic as involving a shift from 
an “experience-of” some object to an “experience-with”, which can 
signify a kind of participatory experience, or I would want to 
say, a kind of enactive performance. There are, however, 
different interpretations of “experience-with” possible. 
Matteucci describes it sometimes in terms of a game, 
a ludus (the object al-ludes, the subject col-ludes); but on a 
Gadamerian reading, this would come along with the idea that 
the experience is one of being lost or entirely absorbed in the 
play. Alternatively, one might take “experience-with” to be a 
return to a specific conception of empathy (Einfühlung), à la 
Theodor Lipps, or more recently the mirror neuron version of 
basic empathy defended by Vittorio Gallese; but this 
interpretation would go towards an internalist view and 
against the extended mind view with which Matteucci aligns.  
 My question is whether we can get to a conception of 
aesthetic experience as “experience-with”, in a more direct way 
by starting with performance, as in the performing arts (dance, 
musical performance, acting), but also extending to athletics 
and even everyday skilled activity. That is, instead of taking 
the typical or standard starting point of asking what is 
aesthetic experience for the observer of an artwork, that is, 
asking about the observer-audience perspective, we start by 
asking what is the aesthetic experience of the dancer, or the 
performing musician, or the actor portraying a character. In the 
performance neither the dance, the music, nor the character is 
an object; rather than an “experience-of” the dance, music, 
character, they are rather enacted by the performer. In this 
kind of enactive performance, which has to be fully embodied 
(not just a brain event), the performer, in some instances, has 
some form of aesthetic experience, which in principle does not 
equate to absorption or being lost in the flow (as someone like 
Dreyfus might think). Rather, the aesthetic experience of the 
performer would be an “experience-with” the dance, the music, 
the character. On the face of it, however, this looks very 




different from what might count as the aesthetic experience of 
the observer or audience, unless, perhaps, one would think that 
observing is itself a skilled performance to some degree. 
 
Giovanni Matteucci: Reply to Shaun Gallagher 
I believe there are many converging points between me 
and Professor Gallagher. In particular, I owe much to his 
proposal to specify the model of the extended mind in an 
enactivist key by retrieving pragmatism, in order to avoid 
aporias which are instead unavoidable in a functionalist key 
(Gallagher 2017, 48-64). This strategy involves the retrieval of 
the notion of “situation” drawn from Dewey, which he presents 
very clearly as follows: 
the situation is not equivalent to the environment. That is, it is not 
that the organism is placed in a situation. Rather the situation is 
constituted by organism-environment, which means that the 
situation already includes the agent or experiencing subject. In this 
regard, for example, if I am in a problematic situation, I cannot 
strictly point to the situation because my pointing is part of the 
situation. I cannot speak of it as some kind of objective set of factors 
because my speaking is part of it. My movement is a movement of the 
situation. Accordingly, the trick to solving a problematic situation is 
not simply to rearrange objects in the environment, but to rearrange 
oneself as well – to make adjustments to one’s own behaviors. Indeed, 
any adjustment one makes to objects, artifacts, tools, practices, social 
relations, or institutions is equally an adjustment of oneself 
(Gallagher 2017, 55-56). 
Shortly afterwards Gallagher adds: 
As extended and enactive, the mind is situated in the way that 
Dewey defines this notion. The situation includes not just our 
notebooks, computers, and other cognitive technologies, and not just 
the social and cultural practices and institutions that help us solve a 
variety of cognitive problems, it also includes us. We are in the world 
in a way that is not reducible to occupying an objective position in the 
geography of surrounding space, and in a way such that the world is 
irreducible to an abstraction of itself represented in one’s brain. We, 
as minded beings, are definitively “out there”, dynamically coupled to 
artifacts, tools, technologies, social practices, and institutions that 
extend our cognitive processes (Gallagher 2017, 59-60). 
Now, if it is true – as Gallagher (2017, 58) observes – 
that “in many regards much depends on how we understand the 
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coupling relation between organism-environment”, I believe 
that characterizing this relation in an aesthetic sense allows to 
best avoid functionalist representationalism. “Situation”, 
indeed, is tantamount to what I have often called “field”, to 
which I attribute the ownership of the processes that take place 
in it (as Gallagher writes: “My movement is a movement of the 
situation”). A situation does not depend on a foundation that is 
either subjective or objective and that would already presume a 
context within which the cognitive thematization takes place, 
i.e. the “pointing” mentioned by Gallagher. In the field of 
experience-with subject and object emerge by virtue of a 
correspondence that dynamically shapes each of its vectors, and 
therefore the two potential poles towards which it extends, 
through the ways of acting and operating of the vectors 
themselves, according to the basic principle of enactivism. And 
only this aesthetic primitiveness explains its potential 
criticality. A situation manifests itself as problematic, in the 
appearance that is carried out in it, according to a coupling that 
coincides with living in a network of plastic references that 
reveal the aspects of the dynamic field that is being inhabited. 
In its appearing under certain aspects, the situation is an 
expressive correspondence that underlies an extended mind. 
Thus, the environment also manifests itself as an aspect 
of the situation, as a nature that becomes human. It operates as 
a relational vector and not as an entity looming over a subject. 
On the other hand, when the organism plays along with the 
situation, it finds itself established for how it manipulates 
expressive devices, according to a material collusion where (the 
practices with) the objects are what shapes the so-called 
subjects more than the other way around. Therefore each 
situation is more than merely biological. It implies a 
configurative artificiality; an expressiveness that, as such, is 
already cultural and social. 
Consequently, my response to the questions raised by 
Gallagher’s contribution could be a simple and convinced 
declaration of approval. It certainly is for what concerns the 
enactive performance that occurs in material collusion. My 
analysis of the constitutive creative principle of the praxes of 
aisthesis adequately shows, I think, how I do not consider such 




an experience to be equivalent “to absorption or being lost in 
the flow”, especially if this means simply recognizing a mere 
passivity of the subject. The immersive character of the 
aesthetic experience is not a “getting lost”, but the articulation 
of a know-how, the exercise – that is – of a competence in a 
situation resembling the exploration of an unprecedented 
scenario in which one has to orient her/himself. I therefore find 
the examples of the dancer and the musician offered by 
Gallagher perfectly fitting. In some recent investigations on 
improvisation meant as a practice of resonance I have moved 
exactly in this direction.  
By the way, I precisely wanted to make reference to this 
by interweaving the “al-lusion” of the manifestation of a field 
and the “col-lusion” through which its vectors, even subjective 
ones, respond to it. These are two elements that I have 
borrowed and freely adapted from Pierre Bourdieu, who nicely 
explains the analytical-material constitution of a habitus and 
therefore what I deem being the principle of sedimentation, 
both in the felt body and in the surrounding environment, of an 
ecological niche. If so, then the notion of ludus loses the traits of 
ontological transcendence that it instead has for Gadamer, or 
the features of simulative practice that it takes on for the new 
theorists of empathy. It is rather a staging of the same field 
operativity. 
Finally, I believe that the performative character of the 
aesthetic is certainly present also on the side of the so-called 
observer, so I would drop Gallagher’s caution at the end of his 
contribution. Also in this case what is at stake is the exercise of 
a know-how, and therefore a “skilled performance”, which is 
always aesthetic rather than cognitive. What one aims to get 
from an aesthetic experience as such is not the acquisition once 
and for all of the (knowledge of a) given. The overall content of 
the aesthetic experience is its own carrying itself out.  
Therefore, as I sometimes say, what captures us 
aesthetically never ceases to fascinate us and induces us to 
reiterate experiences, in some cases even obsessively. The 
source of gratification is the way in which the collusion is 
realized each time, not the outcome to which it leads as a 
determination of an internal content. We listen to musical 
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pieces of which we know every dynamic, we reread poems of 
which we know every syllable by heart, we look at paintings of 
which we could reproduce every square millimeter – just as we 
reactivate the same device to perform the same activity when 
we are gratified by performing it. The “playful” nature of the 
aesthetic lies not least in this intrinsic performativity, which 
stands for the enactment of a significance that makes the 
meanings that are recruited expressive. 
 
3. Tonino Griffero to Giovanni Matteucci 
It is surprising how almost completely different 
bibliographies may sometimes lead to develop almost 
completely different theories. Notwithstanding the existence of 
several similarities between Matteucci’s insightful and far-
reaching aesthetics understood as an “analytic-material 
phenomenology” (Matteucci 2019a, 112), based on the model of 
the “experience-with” rather than “experience-of” (or “knowing-
how” rather than “knowing-that”), and my “pathic aesthetics” 
relying on the experience of “being subject-to” rather than 
“being subject-of” (or “feeling-how” rather than “feeling-that”), I 
can’t silence the existence of some differences between us.  
The latter range – to mention just a few – from 
aesthetics' current need to overcome certain traditional 
shortcomings (i.e. concerning connectivity, for him; resonance, 
for me) to the rejection of the simple identification of aesthetics 
with (allegedly great) art; from the development of a field-
approach leading to a situative-environmental aesthetics that 
emphasizes the importance of appearances as such to the 
refusal of transcendental and only intracranial approaches; 
from the defense of an anti-intentionalist phenomenology and 
the cognitive impenetrability of aesthetic experience (often non-
thematic) to the suspicion towards all kinds of neuro-aesthetic 
reductionism that are still based on a subject/object dualism; 
from fostering aesthetics as perceptual exploration of indiscreet 
surroundings (Matteucci 2019a, 159) to the denial of a merely 
metaphorical and/or anthropomorphic explanation of emotional 
characters, up to conceiving of a relationship (an in-between) 
that precedes the mutually related poles and that constitutes 
them rather than being constituted by them as their outcome 




(with the “only” difference that, for me, their emergence is still 
aesthetic and does not already represent a transition to the 
representative-cognitive dimension, as argued by Matteucci). 
There are still other theoretical focuses that our 
aesthetic theories apparently share, although developing them 
differently (also due to a different philosophical terminology). 
For example, I would not go so far as to consider qualia as 
“without subjectum, without support” (Matteucci 2019a, 152), 
since they undoubtedly change when their material components 
– as real sub-atmospheric generators – change and tinge the 
whole in a fairly different way. Nor is it enough for me to 
explain qualia’s ecstatic spreading through an adverbial form 
and, however, not applying it also to seemingly objective 
attributes (Matteucci 2019a, 52): for me, also “fragile” could 
radiate an atmosphere of caution that is irreducible to its 
chemical-physical properties.  
However, instead of pointing out differences on specific 
points, I mostly prefer here to focus on the mood that permeates 
the book. It exudes a (perhaps excessive) pragmatic-
performative-relational euphoria and, as a result, a sort of fear 
for everything that is relatively (ontologically) stable and 
relatively (phenomenologically, but also culturally) 
transcendent.  
a) This certainly explains the underestimation of art, of 
the (metaphysical) reasons that lie behind the modern genesis 
of aesthetics, of its pedagogical and social role, which Matteucci 
only attributes to aestheticization (Matteucci 2019a, 35), as 
well as the delusion of being able to manage manifestness in 
the absence of (what he calls somewhat ironically) deep 
structures in existence (Matteucci 2019a, 71). 
b) It is not enough to simply claim this to effectively get 
rid of the “haunted circle” of “psychologism, logicism and 
ontologism” (Matteucci 2019a, 100), nor is it enough to play well 
the same game of contemporary aestheticization and thus be 
able to “reduce [its] alienating and dystonic excesses” 
(Matteucci 2019a, 139, fn. 12) without any normative instance. 
c) Beside this, I also note a somewhat stereotypical 
image (even in the eyes of my “pathic” aesthetics) of the 
cognitive sphere that sometimes seems to emerge. Since it is 
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possible that, almost through a rebound effect, the cognitive, in 
turn, arouses an affectively connoted perception, I would raise 
some doubts both about the idea that the way from the affective 
to the cognitive is unidirectional and irreversible (“the more 
effective the content of the experience-with, the more 
indeterminate the content of the experience-of”: Matteucci 
2019a, 65), and about the idea that the “facts” are only those 
explained by the natural sciences and not the first-personal and 
affective ones (which are for me the “facts” above all ‒ since it is 
only to them that we owe the absolute certainty of their being-
in-the-world).  
d) Of course, considering my topics, I “have” to say 
something about Matteucci’s treatment of my atmospherology 
(especially Matteucci 2019a, 157 ff.), which ‒ it has to be said a 
limine ‒ certainly does not aim to systematically define the 
status of aesthetics but just to offer an interpretation of the 
aesthetic niche (in the broadest sense) through a brand-new 
radical affective externalism. The way I use to talk about 
“quasi-things” is not meant to propose any kind of dogmatic 
reification, but only to ascribe to feelings poured into the 
surrounding space ‒ a spatial dimension, the latter (namely, 
the lived space and not the geometric-physical one, of course), 
that is strongly underestimated by the book in favour of only 
mental “scenarios” ‒ an agency normally attributed to subjects 
and objects. Several passages in the book try to explain the 
irrefutable experience of the non-coincidence between feeling 
and affective involvement (for example: a face appears 
threatening to me even though I do not feel threatened, etc.), as 
well as the fact (Matteucci 2019a, 195) that the “same” emotion 
can give rise to different forms of effectiveness (in my terms: to 
different felt-bodily resonances). In doing so, however, 
Matteucci seems to rely on a hardly usable adaequatio criterion 
(“in the absence of a compatible tuning intonation the affection 
would not go to the target”) (Matteucci 2019a, 164) and, what is 
worse, excludes the most inspiring atmospheric experience: 
feeling the authority of atmospheres regardless of own 
perceptual conditions and their expansively getting the better 
of other coexisting feelings. This authority cannot be kicked 




down to a perception of bistable figure (a good cue which I 
intend to treasure, anyway!) or a result of a “peaceful” 
relationship.  In the attempt not to identify the affective either 
with a subjective or with an objective state, the book 
underestimates the absolute involvement, here translated in 
the weakened form of a “collusion” and “participation” and 
explained through a dispositionalism that is totally alien to an 
emotional phenomenology aimed at emphasizing both the 
atmospheres’ quasi-objectivity and the absolute (that is, not 
merely self-attributing) subjectivity that the felt body’s 
involvement solely is able to attest. The quasi-thingly 
aggression of pain or of a threatening sky ‒ which is “aesthetic” 
inasmuch as it goes beyond, respectively, medical epistemology 
and weather-forecasting ‒ is not an experience that one simply 
“participates” to. Nor can the deep tension hovering over a 
conflictual meeting be paraphrased (see Matteucci 2019a, 143), 
except in a very reductive-subjective way, as “X perceives 
tensely”. Considering the aesthetic as an assurance of the 
coevolution of organism and environment, it is then reductive to 
understand an immediate affection as dependent on what is 
only indirectly accessible. 
My main objection, however, concerns the (felt) body, the 
great absentee in this ‒ in other respects ‒ meritorious and 
large-scale project. Instead of an embodied, enactive and 
situated (extended) mind, one should actually speak of an 
extended felt-bodilyhood understood as intercorporeality or felt-
bodily communication (or interaction). By talking about the 
mind (as if we knew, phenomenologically, what it really is) or 
the organism, at best (as if we could consider it independently 
of its just anatomic inspection), and not about the felt (or lived) 
body, in my view the book ends up escaping the main subject of 
any phenomenological aesthetics. Everything here is fluid, 
relational and put back to the praxis as a catch-all justification. 
Nevertheless, at the end of the day this could also be an 
irreducible difference in the way we develop our basic (and, as 
such, not rationally justifiable) Stimmungen. 
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Giovanni Matteucci: Reply to Tonino Griffero 
While I have nothing to add with regard to the 
similarities that Professor Griffero points out, I find it difficult 
to understand how to respond to the various objections that he 
makes. If they mean that my research does not fall within 
atmospherology, I have no problem to admit it. The very 
perspective of a “pathic aesthetics” advocated by Griffero, which 
draws from a living “subject-to rather than subject-of” 
corporeality, is problematic for me. What I see in it is a simple 
reversal of modern gnoseologism, in which one merely changes 
the sign of a dualist division that, in my opinion, the aesthetic 
calls into question. This is what the attempt to start from the 
relationship as such, as an experiential dimension and not as 
an ontological entity or reality, aims at, recognizing that the 
aesthetic concerns the phenomenology of experience rather 
than the ontology of the world. Perhaps this is the underlying 
reason for Griffero’s particular reading of my research, which 
he blames for what he calls a “pragmatic-performative-
relational euphoria”. On the contrary, my ambition would be to 
describe the praxes of aisthesis in their ambivalent 
active/passive dimension, as I tried to show, and not only to 
declare. 
I am not surprised, however, to learn that the aesthetic 
cannot be reduced to an atmosphere. This could actually mean 
that an atmospherology does not describe the aesthetic as such. 
As a matter of fact, my reference to atmospherology emerges 
during an articulated analysis of the aesthetic implications of 
emotional experience. The pressing question in that context is: 
what makes an emotional experience aesthetic and why is there 
apparently a privileged link between the aesthetic and the 
emotional? To this end, emotion is described in its performative, 
manifestative and extended components, rather than as a 
“quasi-thing”. And if what makes an emotional experience 
aesthetic appears to be something different from its (presumed? 
verified?) being atmospherical, then this perhaps supports the 
idea that talking about emotions as quasi-things presupposes the 
adoption, using reversed values, of the modern canon, which 
mortifies precisely the aesthetic component of experience. 




As for the single questions that Griffero lists, I would 
like to clarify what follows. Ad (a): It was not my intention to 
underestimate art, but to invite to consider art also from the 
point of view of the aesthetic before considering it from the 
perspective of the modern cultural ideology of the Fine Arts. 
And this was in no way meant to disregard art’s pedagogical 
and social role. Rather, the question of aestheticization is 
introduced to show how strikingly and evidently today the 
aesthetic has exceeded the limited sphere of the Fine Arts. This 
forces us to rethink the aesthetic/artistic pair which, I believe, 
has been entrenched in recent centuries’ thought. Ad (b): The 
question of the “normativity” eventually involved in aesthetics 
is not evaded, but rather largely discussed, I think. The point is 
that it is dealt with in those operative, and not thematic terms 
that I deem congruous with the aesthetic. Thus this question 
plays, for example, a crucial role in the chapter of my book on 
creativity, where I advocate the opportunity to replace the 
usual reference to rules (whether determining or reflecting) 
with a reference to the tendential constraints of the 
manifestation and experiential exploration (in particular see: 
Matteucci 2019a, 104-109; 2019b, 170-171). Ad (c): I absolutely 
do not aim to support an alleged one-sidedness and 
irreversibility in the relationship between the aesthetic and the 
cognitive, or even between the phenomenal and the factual, so 
much so that I speak of “primitives” that are largely 
intertwined, to the point of mutually sustaining each other (as 
in the examples available in Matteucci 2019a, 146-148). Ad (d): 
I have already commented on my only partial convergence with 
atmospherology. I must clarify, however, that I do not believe 
that my position can be reduced to the criterion of adaequatio. 
However, this is not due to the fact that I fear this ghost that 
haunts every twentieth-century hermeneutics, as it were, but is 
rather connected to the performative and enactive character of 
the extended mind on which I insist. The passage quoted by 
Griffero (taken from Matteucci 2019a, 164) concerns a 
relationship that stands out by itself as expressive 
correspondence, and therefore as “resonance” – a principle 
underpinning the last chapter on expression and which 
elsewhere I have explored explicitly in these terms. But it is 
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precisely because of this relational characterization that I 
confirm my reluctance to speak of “quasi-things”, as well as 
those quasi-subjects that seem to me to be ontologized bodies, 
for a description of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic resonance is 
not the rumble that occurs in the empty hollow of a sound box 
(such as the lived body, subject to an atmosphere, would be); it 
is rather the material vibration of a harmonious plane that is 
carried out in the very manifestation of the vectors that enact 
the phenomenon by corresponding to the collusive field. 
The general final objection raised by Griffero confirms 
what has already emerged. Starting from the body would imply 
to start from a relatum; it is the blind alley that even Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception cannot help ending up in. 
Describing a relationship that also recruits the full corporeality 
as its own vector is a different enterprise. And it is precisely in 
this relationship that the “extended mind” lies, certainly 
neither in a disembodied spirit nor in a physiological, cerebral 
or visceral endowment. And so I try to remain faithful to a 
conception of phenomenology as description of institutive 
relational structures rather than more or less material 
instituted entities, of phenomena rather than facts. 
 
4. Jerrold Levinson to Giovanni Matteucci 
My understanding of Professor Matteucci’s views is based 
on the papers Matteucci (2018) and (2019b), plus a careful 
reading of sections of Chapter 2 (“Il paradigma dell’esperienza-
con”) and Chapter 4 (“Il precepire estetico”) of his book 
(Matteucci 2019). Given the pitfalls of communication across 
different languages and differing philosophical traditions, the 
risks of misunderstanding are of course far from negligible. 
1. One of the central ideas in Professor Matteucci’s novel 
approach to aesthetic experience is the notion of experience-with 
an object in contrast to experience-of an object. The distinction 
is characterized by Matteucci along roughly these lines: while 
experience-of implies distanced apprehension of preexisting 
perceptual content, experience-with implies being made to 
perceive in a way that is not specifiable prior to and outside of 
the experience itself. When one has experience-of an object, 
neither the subject nor the object is changed; when one has 




experience-with an object, by contrast, subject and object are 
altered in the process and partly fuse with one another, giving 
rise to something that does not antecedently exist. 
The notion of experience-with an object, which Matteucci 
regards as fundamental to an experience being an aesthetic one, 
arises naturally from an ecological-phenomenological view of 
perception familiar to us from the writings of figures such as 
John Dewey, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, and James Gibson. It is good to be reminded that 
aesthetic experience is often a complex affair, involving aspect 
perception, horizons of consciousness, response to affordances, 
and the like—that aesthetic experience is more than a 
mechanical registering of fixed, already constituted appearances. 
Matteucci’s analysis of aesthetic experience as consisting 
centrally in experiencing-with foregrounds above all aesthetic 
experience’s interactivity, its conscripting of imagination, 
exploration, and conjecture to a more pronounced degree than 
other perceptual experiences. But is not all perceptual 
experience interactive to some extent? Does not all such 
experience involve give and take between subject and object, in 
which both subject and object find themselves temporarily 
transformed in the course of their interaction? 
More importantly, in my view Matteucci fails to 
recognize that such interaction can be conceived as a way of 
discovering the aesthetic or artistic or expressive properties of 
the object experienced, rather than a process in which those 
properties are created, where such properties are understood 
as something like powers or dispositions to affect in particular 
ways subjects that engage with them. From my perspective, it 
is precisely by interacting with an object – perceiving it under 
various aspects, focusing it in different ways, being affected by 
it, that one comes to know it, including knowing what 
properties it has. 
I submit that Matteucci’s brief for the deep interactivity 
of aesthetic experience need not deny that there is a sustainable 
distinction between subjects and objects. Nor that objects have 
aesthetic and artistic properties when not being experienced. Nor 
that experience involving an object may be at once both an 
experiencing-with an object (whereby the subject cooperates with 
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and is transiently entangled with the object) and an 
experiencing-of the object (whereby the subject is positioned to 
discern the properties actually possessed by the object). 
2. Matteucci rejects the thesis of aesthetic properties as 
higher-order perceptual properties, supervenient on lower-order 
ones, instead proposing that aesthetic properties so-called are 
in reality just non-aesthetic properties functioning differently 
in aesthetic contexts – contexts in which there is experiencing-
with objects – which novel functioning he labels intervenience 
(see Matteucci 2019a, 148-151). But the examples adduced to 
illustrate this position, such as the properties of blueness and 
angularity that some paintings of Matisse or Klee exemplify, do 
not support the position, since this simply overlooks that ‘blue’ 
and ‘angular’ are ambiguous predicates, having both a non-
aesthetic, or literal, employment, and an aesthetic, or 
metaphorical employment. Ontological differences, such as 
between properties of fundamentally different kinds, do not 
disappear because one chooses not to recognize them. 
3. Matteucci shows himself to be an enthusiastic 
embracer of the Extended Mind paradigm of mental life (EMP), 
as opposed to a more Classical or Cartesian paradigm of it. The 
EMP holds, in brief, that the mind is more than the brain, or 
even the brain-body complex, and that it extends to entities 
outside that complex, that is, outside the embodied person. On 
the EMP, the mind includes tools, devices, and props that aid in 
perception, cognition, emotion, or memory. Entities such as 
computers, cell phones, journals, notebooks, calculators, search 
engines, the cloud, and so on. 
But even if one fully accepts the EMP, it is still perfectly 
possible to distinguish the subject so extended from a given 
object with which it interacts and thus experiences. To say that 
two things, X and Y, interact, that they respond to or react to or 
affect one another, does not in itself entail that X and Y are no 
longer distinct, does not render inevitable dissolution of the 
distinction between X and Y. 
Furthermore, should we accept the EMP as understood 
by its proponents – that is to say, in a strong sense, whereby 
mentality is taken to extend literally to inanimate objects, 
rather than just a metaphor that brings into relief important 




aspects of the way human beings now cognitively interact with 
and impact the world around them? I for one am inclined to 
respond in the negative. 
4. I return in conclusion to Professor Matteucci’s 
preferred conception of the aesthetic, which he opposes to more 
traditional ones, a conception that is well expressed in these 
quotations from the paper “Implications of Creativity” cited 
above. “It is the modality in which the interaction between an 
organism and its environment takes place that qualifies an 
experience as aesthetic, and not properties of either the 
organism or the environment in themselves” (Matteucci 2019a, 
172). “The aesthetic designates an organism-environment 
interaction so integrated as to generate a kind of collusion or 
interpenetration between them” (Matteucci 2019a, 173). 
But is this not true of every case of successful 
perception? That there is this sort of integration, 
interpenetration, or interactivity? It seems to me that the 
distinctive character of aesthetic perception, which perhaps 
resides in the species of attention it involves, has been missed. 
Interactions in which an object is involved vary in character or 
focus, in what they invite us to attend to and in what way, and 
it is that, in my view, which makes them aesthetic or not (see on 
this my essay Levinson 2016, and particularly endnote 7). 
 
Giovanni Matteucci: Reply to Jerrold Levinson 
Professor Levinson points out that experience-with, as I 
describe it, would imply a process of transformation of both 
subject and object: “when one has experience-with an object 
[…], subject and object are altered in the process and partly 
fuse with one another, giving rise to something that does not 
antecedently exist”. I thank him for drawing attention to this 
aspect. It is something that my research perhaps evokes but in 
fact neglects to discuss, thus lending itself even more to 
criticism of partiality. However, I would call this neglect 
programmatic, so to speak. I do not delve into what changes in 
the subject and/or in the object for a precise reason that is very 
important to me. Saying that subject and/or object are “altered” 
in the course of experience-with would logically imply to believe 
that these two polarities are already “genuinely” constituted 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – XII (2) / 2020 
624 
 
before the experiential interaction. And this is precisely the 
point, as I have tried to reiterate extensively in previous 
answers while talking about the primitive relational operativity 
of the aesthetic as expressive correspondence. 
In this sense, the aspects that we categorize in judgment 
as aesthetic properties operate expressively in the in-between of 
a correspondence (cf. Ingold 2015, 154), they inter-vene: they 
deserve this qualification as long as they unfold an aesthetic 
potential. Therefore I am not only talking – as Levinson would 
hope – about a “discovery”, but actually not even about a 
“creation” of aesthetic properties. One would otherwise run the 
risk of tracing aesthetic perception back to an ascertainment of 
something that is thematic, to an act that is cognitive or, in any 
case, functional to knowledge. On the contrary, I believe that 
the perceptual praxis is aesthetic insofar as (it is a matter of 
degree!) it is not resolved in the mere ascertainment. So-called 
aesthetic properties are not discovered or created, but rather 
expressed in the praxis of perceiving and feeling as aspects of 
the manifestative field: they are embodied in cor-responding 
perceptualizations of gestural, verbal and behavioral 
configurations, which reveal not so much what they are but how 
they operate – in other words, by further articulating their 
operativity. It is the way in which (i.e. how) we look at a 
painting, or listen to a musical piece, that testifies whether we 
know how to perceive with it, that is, whether we correspond to 
what thus intervenes to connote the situation. In my opinion, 
Frank Sibley’s seminal essay on aesthetic concepts indicates a 
similar path, especially in its second part, when it deals with 
the way the critic must operate in order to be aesthetically 
effective in her/his practice of “perceptualization”, and not of 
“conceptualization” (see Sibley 2001, 13 ff.). I believe that these 
pages should be read in continuity with the analysis of 
performativity carried out by Austin’s linguistic phenomenology, 
a crucial hidden reference for Sibley. 
The problem is therefore not whether it is legitimate to 
attribute to an object certain properties of some order instead of 
another. Simply because it obviously is. One possible outcome is 
nevertheless the assessment of more or less intersubjectively 
working properties of the perceptual interaction. One can 




always attempt to transfer the knowing-how which is intrinsic 
to the aesthetic in a technical knowing-how or even in a 
knowing-that. The problem is, if anything, to understand in 
what sense aesthetic experience embodies this knowledge. Now, 
as I see it, knowing-that and a technical knowing become 
aesthetically relevant to the extent that they restore their own 
operativity as aesthetic knowing-how. Knowing the physical or 
factual properties of a color, a sound, a linguistic construction 
can be a requirement for working according to a certain style. 
However, the aesthetic experience of that color, sound, or text 
consists in the way the device operates as a manifestation, and 
not as a given that is determined by cognitive or technical 
contents. On the contrary, the history of artistic failures often 
attests how technique and knowledge, if reduced to their 
thematizing character, can prevent the aesthetic manifestation 
from taking place. Let us just think of how difficult it is to 
perform a musical piece even once it has been thoroughly 
“studied”, despite the easiness shown by some musicians 
(including some who are not really high-skilled) in making it 
extraordinarily working in spite of imperfections, and 
sometimes even by virtue of them. So I agree with those who 
maintain that an intrinsic part of art is a certain “imperfection”, 
provided this is a sign of the fact that it is the density of the field 
that sets the standard details of a material and never a purely 
ideal completeness. In this sense, although not beyond these 
limits, I would say that the density of the field “prevails” over the 
determination of the details. And it is precisely in this light that 
I would recommend understanding my refusal to assume an 
ontological perspective in my analysis of aesthetic properties.  
I would consider the predicates that Levinson then 
defines as “ambiguous” as, rather, “bistable predicates”. As 
Sibley clarifies when, in the aforementioned essay, he comes to 
consider aesthetic terms of which “we cannot say that these are 
learned by a metaphorical shift” (Sibley 2001, 22), these 
predicates too are as little ambiguous as little metaphorical. 
What is missing, in fact, is a “more literal” way of expressing 
what they say. The aesthetic use of such predicates reveals, in 
this sense, an “inter-venient” potential, i.e. operative within the 
experiential field, which is to be articulated in further 
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corresponding sensible praxes. This is not a matter of 
ascertaining an internal content, but of an overall content that 
cannot be totally reduced to non-aesthetic thematization. 
Transforming the dynamic tension between the operative 
(aesthetic) and the thematic (non-aesthetic) into an ontological 
difference between properties of different hierarchical levels is 
already an act of thematization. It would be the same as 
transforming the illocutionary force of a performative utterance 
into a (element of) constative propositional content, where it is 
instead a matter of experience with the utterance. 
Nevertheless, such hypostatization is still possible, and even 
legitimate for the construction of a theory or even a science, 
while it remains reductive with respect to the density of the 
experiential field. My hypothesis is that such is the general 
nature of aesthetic pseudo-predication, as I explain in the last 
chapter of the book where I deal with the similar operativity (or 
inter-venience) connoting also the so-called aesthetic judgments 
and so-called aesthetic descriptions. 
As for the third question from Levinson, I would like to 
underline again that the conception of the Extended Mind 
paradigm that I support is enactivist, not functionalist, as it 
has often been instead the case, since the now canonical 
proposal of Clark and Chalmers. Functionalistically, the mind 
“extends” itself because some of its functions are attributed to 
portions of the external world, i.e. to the scaffoldings or 
supports that we find in the external world (as in the famous 
example of Inga and Otto’s notebook). From an enactivist 
approach, instead, I would speak of extended mind as a 
specification of what John Dewey meant when he recalled that 
“mind is primarily a verb” (Dewey 1987, 258). Much debate on 
the notion of the mind starts from the neglect of this indication. 
Considering this verbality means – or at least it may mean – 
emphasizing the modality rather than the substantiality of the 
mind. Mind is the mode of operation that involves in its own field 
the expressive continuity that is a coupling of organism and 
environment rather than a substantial entity that acts on body 
and world. In this sense, it is primitively (also) a relationship of 
correspondence that is embodied in non-thematizing 
environmental explorations. This is why I believe that, when we 




speak of an extended mind, the idea that a mind which is 
intracranial first, and only then “gets extended” in order to 
include portions of the outer world, is misleading. And this is also 
why I believe that the paradigm of the extended mind has much 
more than a merely metaphorical meaning, given its ability to 
properly describe the collusive relationality on which judicative 
and cognitive acts are grafted. As Peirce wrote, “it is no figure of 
speech to say that the alembics and cucurbits of the chemist are 
instruments of thought, or logical machines.” (Peirce 1887, 168) 
 
5. Claudio Paolucci to Giovanni Matteucci 
The Extended Mind theory has been connected, by Andy 
Clark himself, to a theory of perception based on Predictive 
Processing (PP). The main idea is that the brain and the mind 
try to anticipate the world by using previous knowledge stored 
both in the brain and the environment. This is why percepts, 
according to Clark, are always conceptualized, since perception 
is not the sampling of the features of the external world, but the 
effect of the creative activity of the brain that uses concepts and 
meanings in order to generate the perceptual flow. This view is 
known to have some important scientific and empirical data to 
rely on. In Estetica e natura umana, Matteucci rather opts for 
the idea of “Perceptual Praxis”, whose main feature is to be not 
finalized and functional to knowledge or cognition. So, given the 
focus on action that both the PP and the Perceptual Praxis 
seem to share, which is the relationship with meanings, habits 
and previous knowledge that perception has in Matteucci’s 
view, grounded on the “cognitive disengagement” (Matteucci 
2019, 111) of perception and aesthetics? 
The idea of experience introduced in this book 
(“experience-with”) is extremely original. However, at least in 
some parts of the book, it seems to be traced back to somehow 
classical oppositions: (i) the phenomenological opposition 
between “predicative” and “ante-predicative”, with the 
correlative primacy of the second term over the first; (ii) the 
overthrowing of the Kantian relation between experience and 
judgement (see Melandri and Piana’s quotations in chapter 4). In 
my opinion, Matteucci’s notion of “experience-with” and his 
version of the “Extended Mind” grounded on the “prototypicality” 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – XII (2) / 2020 
628 
 
of the aesthetic have the power of overcoming these old 
oppositions. For instance, the “experience-with” and the extended 
mind have their prototypical embodiment in aesthetics, but we 
can also find them in every other dimension of our experience, not 
only in his aesthetic aspects (the Extended Mind theory was 
introduced mainly as a theory of beliefs and propositional 
attitudes). This paves the way for a continuity between 
“aesthetics” and “noethics”, between experience and judgement, 
and from my point of view there is no need to trace back all those 
original ideas to old ways of thinking and to old oppositions 
coming from phenomenology and Kantian philosophy. 
 
Giovanni Matteucci: Reply to Claudio Paolucci 
I do not have much to add to what has already been said, 
in order to reply to Professor Paolucci’s observations. On the 
contrary, he grasps in a very effective way the passage from a 
functionalist key to an enactivist key in the conception of the 
paradigm of the extended mind when he emphasizes the shift 
that is due to the transition from “predictive processing” to 
“perceptual praxis”, glimpsing in this the change of scenery from 
cognitive experience in the proper sense to aesthetic experience.  
Also with regard to the opposing couples that Paolucci 
correctly lists, I would like to refer the reader to what has been 
said in some previous replies. I would just add that there is 
continuity between operativity and thematization, the same 
way in which the discrete set of natural numbers and the dense 
set of rational numbers are infinite. For example, the range 
between 0 and 10 represented on a straight line describes the 
same extensional range regardless of whether the digits are 
considered symbols of either natural or rational numbers, and 
yet according to distinct orders for density/discreteness, or even 
for a distinct texture – for a distinct relational mode of possible 
exploration. Similarly, the potential of aesthetic density still 
innervates propositional predication, but it is expressed the 
more it emancipates itself from its own denotative function. On 
the basis of this relationship, in the final chapter of the book I 
carry out an analysis of linguistic expression, talking about 
para-propositionality, para-evaluation and para-description as 




aesthetic uses of what has a propositional, evaluative and 
descriptive form.  
I therefore agree to a certain extent that this means 
parting from “old ways of thinking and […] old oppositions 
coming from phenomenology and Kantian philosophy”. The 
continuity between experience and judgment recalled by 
Paolucci probably contradicts a doctrine based on the modular 
faculties of the mind. Yet, from a phenomenological point of 
view it remains crucial to distinguish between density and 
discreteness, and therefore between ante-predicative field and 
predicative configuration. There must be some residuality in 
the passage from the one to the other, if – as Umberto Eco 
wrote – we must recognize that “in the magma of the 
continuum there are lines of resistance and possibilities of flow, 
as in the grain of wood or marble, which make it easier to cut in 
one direction than in another” (Eco 1999, 53). I would say that 
the main topic of my research is precisely the “processing waste” 
generated by the predicative treatment of the experiential 
material, so to speak, convinced as I am that there is a potential 
for meaning that nurtures the propositional meaning itself as 
expressive. Therefore, I consider the material analytics that I try 
to carry out as a way of practicing a non-continuistic (and 
perhaps à rebours) reading of what is already largely to be found 
in Husserl’s phenomenology, following a direction that is not 
canonically genetic but – so to speak – archaeological. 
 
6. Richard Shusterman to Giovanni Matteucci 
I should begin my question with a clarification. In your 
critique of the subject/object dualism you see in what you call 
the aesthetic “experience-of” (in the chapter “The (Aesthetic) 
Extended Mind”) you identify the distinction I make between 
transformative and demarcational theories of aesthetic 
experience as the first example of such a dualism. However, my 
transformative/demarcational distinction is not to contrast 
theories that emphasis the subject’s experience versus the 
object and its properties; it is rather to contrast theories that 
seek to transform our understanding and concept of aesthetic 
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experience and art versus theories that seek simply to define or 
demarcate the extension of our established concept of aesthetic 
experience or of art. Either of these two kinds of theory could 
emphasize either the subject or the object in aesthetic 
experience (cf. Shusterman 1997; 2006; 2019). 
I come now to my main line of questioning, which 
involves some sub-questions. The basic question is whether you 
would be satisfied with replacing the subject/object dualism of 
aesthetic experience with a new dualism of “experience-of” and 
“experience-with” or whether you prefer a monistic theory 
where only “experience-with” would be seen as valid for 
understanding aesthetic experience (because you think 
“experience-of” is contaminated with old-fashioned dualism). 
Would you agree that there are a broader range of different 
conceptions of aesthetic experience that reflect and serve the 
different forms and purposes that aesthetic experience takes (a 
view I’ve in fact proposed)? Or would you insist that there are 
only the two concepts of aesthetic experience that you outline 
and that we should ultimately reject the dualistic one for the 
new one of “experience-with” that you argue is more suited to 
contemporary culture’s preoccupation with experiencing art and 
other aesthetic matters collectively through social media and 
“selfies”. Don’t you find something redeeming in the traditional 
view that respects the alterity of the art object as something 
that gives more power and edification to aesthetic experience 
and that generates more enlightening art criticism? (I think 
here also of Adorno’s emphasis on the enigmatic character of 
the art object and its challenge to “selfie” subjectivity, hardly a 
subjectivity he would endorse). To sum up my question, given 
the complex variety of aesthetic experience (including the 
complexity of the multiple, overlapping social fields in which it 
takes place) would not a broader conceptual pluralism be 
useful? Besides the different conceptions I’ve analyzed 
elsewhere, but following your interesting prepositional 
approach, could we perhaps also embrace an “experience-in”, an 
“experience-on”, or even an “experience-off”? 
 




Giovanni Matteucci: Reply to Richard Shusterman 
I owe Professor Shusterman an apology. In fact, I did not 
do justice to his seminal essay on aesthetic experience 
(Shusterman 1997), while using it exclusively to draw a scheme 
that I consider exemplary for introducing positions that 
emerged later, leaving aside his intentions and rich insights, 
and even more so regardless of some further developments in 
his research. The reason, however, is that I found his approach 
well suited to bring out a dichotomous polarization that persists 
in contemporary aesthetic reflections. So, I would say that mine 
was a clumsy manner of paying tribute to the excellent clarity 
of his argumentation. 
As for Shusterman’s questions, I have already had the 
opportunity to point out that I do not see the distinction 
between “experience-of” and “experience-with” as a dualism, if 
by this is meant the stance of two mutually exclusive principles. 
Hybridization phenomena are indeed recurrent, and I think 
that Homo sapiens stands out for its ability to manage the 
interweaving between primitive antinomic instances (and hence 
not juxtaposed ones, although seemingly contradictory if 
conceived of as fixed) even on the same sensible-perceptual 
level. In order to explain this interweaving, I often refer to the 
gestalt-switch of bistable perception or even to the 
“twofoldness” dear to Richard Wollheim. These phenomena only 
find a proper explanation when one is able to gather the 
different levels that intersect in them. We make an experience 
with the famous duck-rabbit image only when every figural 
ascertainment fails, by grasping in the internal contents of a 
perception of it (now as duck, now as rabbit) the aspects of an 
overall manifestation that takes place in the experience that we 
have with it, that is, when the switch is enacted. This becomes 
possible only if the relationship does not concern ontological 
determinations (which, if contradictory, would necessarily 
exclude each other) but operative modes that are carried out in 
the same experiential arc. The fixed contradiction thus becomes 
a principle of mutual indeterminability, which as such is 
capable of accepting both the primitive instances that I 
emphasize, while at the same time restoring them in their 
perceptualizing operativity. What happens when, in seeing a 
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human being covered by an animal’s skin, we experience with it 
the apparition of a divinity, or even when, in seeing and 
manipulating the display of a touch-screen device, we 
experience with it a virtual match of some sport, seems to me a 
good explanation of the phenomenon. As a matter of fact, 
moreover, today’s designers (like all artists have always done) 
are familiar with the problem, since they try to design 
experiences by producing certain interfaces. 
Finally, as to the question of the plurality of experiential 
modes, from a factual point of view I agree with Shusterman’s 
suggestion, but at the same time I think that, from a strictly 
phenomenological point of view, this is not relevant. If, with 
Dewey, we consider experience as the interaction between 
organism and environment, it’s either one of the two following 
things. When we want to describe this interaction, we can start 
from the distinction between organism and environment as 
already constituted entities; if so, then the interaction has to be 
considered phenomenologically extrinsic, as the tenet of 
“experience-of” does (which, in fact, tries to reconnect 
downstream what had been previously disjointed). Otherwise, 
we can start from a description of the relationship as a 
“situation”, as a field from which organisms and environment 
tend to emerge. This complex instituting process does not have 
the features of a categorial determination. As shown in a 
perhaps not univocal but anyway certainly accentuated manner 
by the first phases of development of a human being, it rather 
has the traits of the expressive correspondence that shapes an 
extended mind, since, in place of something merely external, 
the environmental vectors populate the same situation in which 
a sense of the self is being shaped. Then, however, experience 
has to be conceived of starting from the intrinsic nexus that 
binds to the same field all the vectors acting in it. This is 
precisely what I try to capture through the formula “experience-
with”. Phenomenologically, experience-of cannot but being 
considered as extrinsic and experience-with as intrinsic. 
When, on the other hand, we aim to describe factual 
forms of experience, then we can certainly find various and 
further articulations, expressed by the wide range of 
prepositions that, not by chance, are made available to us by 




natural languages. But for each of these concretizations the 
question remains whether they are “experiences-of” or 
“experiences-with”, or combinations of them. I would also add 
that, in my opinion, the sense of otherness is even more radical 
in experience-with, precisely because it arises through 
continuity. The texture that I have tried to describe in my 
writings reveals a perception that generates salience, that 
makes itself be felt as a shudder interrupting all automatisms 
precisely because it is not cognitively dominated but rather 
appears. In its aesthetic meaningfulness it is both a promise 
and a threat, as it is charged with an expressive appeal, so 
much so that it awakens the maximum “tenderness for things”. 
Identifying, and therefore violent, is rather, on its part, the 
experience of, even in the form of the “religion of modern art” 
that a philosopher like Adorno abhorred, perhaps even more 
than the mass art produced by the culture industry that he 
famously disliked. 
 
7. Simona Chiodo to Giovanni Matteucci 
Matteucci’s book offers a major contribution to the 
development of a philosophical perspective that, first, attributes 
a crucial role to the aesthetic when it comes to shaping our 
complex experience of the world and, second, actually 
overcomes the dualism between the human as the 
(experiencing) subject and the world as the (experienced) object. 
More precisely, Matteucci’s notion of “experience-with” can even 
strengthen the very philosophical notion of extended mind, in 
that “[a]esthetic statements, after all, make possible the 
experience of the immanent background, of the emotional 
habitus (Stimmung or mood) of an extended mind’s field of 
experience” (cf. Matteucci 2019a, 245; my translation). 
I think that this philosophical perspective is promising, 
and my question to the author is a kind of provocative boost, as 
it were, to ask to what extent the aesthetic, as it is thought of 
by him, may provide us with tools that, paradoxically enough, 
may even risk to be atrophied in Western culture, which (as I 
am trying to argue in my current research) has been 
hypertrophying for millennia, on the contrary, what we define 
as logos (sometimes literally against other human resources). 
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In order to do that, I would like to start from an example 
of something that really happened to me. A few years ago, a 
member of my family was told by the staff of a good public 
hospital that she could have the chance to run a genetic test, 
since in her family there were cases of a specific cancer. The 
hospital used a protocol to distinguish those who could run it 
from those who could not run it. The first step was to fill a 
questionnaire on the health history of the family. I helped the 
member of my family fill it: several data were necessarily 
imprecise, whether because they were not available at all or 
because we could not remember them. The second step was the 
analysis of the questionnaire we brought back to the hospital. 
Finally, we got an official letter from the hospital in which it 
was literally written down that, according to the “predictive 
algorithm” that processed the data of the questionnaire, the 
member of my family could not have the chance to run the 
genetic test, since her risk to be genetically predisposed to 
suffering from that specific cancer was not high enough. Of 
course, the decision of the “predictive algorithm” was 
meaningful not only for her, but also for her relatives (starting 
from me). As for the member of my family, she did not know 
what an algorithm is precisely, like most people of her age. Yet, 
accordingly to the circumstances in which she had heard about 
algorithms, she thought that an algorithm is something that we 
can rely on, being more reliable than a human being. As for me, 
even if I knew something more about what an algorithm is 
(starting from its constitutive limits), I realised that my first 
reaction was the reassuring thought according to which I could 
have avoided checking my health yearly, i.e., feeling anxiety 
yearly, waiting for the results of the tests. I may sum this 
experience up by saying that we both thought, at least at the 
beginning, that an algorithm may happen to be more reliable 
than a human being (doctors included), since the former can be 
absolutely stable and the latter can be absolutely unstable (for 
instance, the latter can make a mistake for the most 
idiosyncratic emotional reasons). 
This is quite a typical Western bias, which may be quite 
wrong, as well as quite dangerous. In any case, the fact that a 
letter, and not a doctor, says that an algorithm (and, in 




particular, a “predictive algorithm”), and not a doctor, has the 
power to decide that someone cannot have the chance to run a 
genetic test, is most meaningful for both epistemological and 
ethical reasons. 
Now, let us try to add some possible aesthetic reasons. 
In particular, I want to stress what follows: contemporary 
medicine seems to progressively make protocols absolute, and 
to consequently risk, first, to end up neglecting precious 
resources that a human being has and an algorithm has not, 
and, second, to end up atrophying these precious resources. 
More precisely, we may think that a doctor, differently from an 
algorithm, can understand, somehow intuitively, that 
something is going wrong with her patient from the look on her 
patient’s face, for instance. In this case, the doctor knows 
something that may be crucial even if she cannot say precisely 
what and why, or even if all she can say is only that it is a 
matter of a kind of feeling. 
My question to the author has to do with this 
“intuitively”, with this “kind of feeling”: according to 
Matteucci’s philosophical view, what may be the meaning of 
this “intuitively”, of this “kind of feeling”, which may be crucial? 
More precisely, what may be the meaning of relying also on the 
doctor as a human being, and not only on “predictive 
algorithms”? More provocatively, are we allowed to think that, 
beside the aesthetic (or even included in the aesthetic), there 
are human resources that we are progressively not only 
neglecting, but also atrophying, by even arriving to think of 
them as a kind of taboo in Western culture? Should we try (even 
courageously) to name them, also through our philosophical 
tools? And should we think that, after all, it may be a nonsense 
to invest billions of Euros or dollars on algorithms and almost 
nothing on the most embarrassing mysteries of the human mind, 
i.e., on what is remarkably far from logos? 
(After all, even Goodman wrote in Languages of art that 
“[i]n daily life, classification of things by feeling is often more 
vital than classification by other properties: we are likely to be 
better off if we are skilled in fearing, wanting, braving, or 
distrusting the right things, animate or inanimate, than if we 
perceive only their shapes, sizes, weights, etc. And the 
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importance of discernment by feeling does not vanish when the 
motivation becomes theoretic rather than practical”. Yet, it may 
be necessary to go even one step further). 
 
Giovanni Matteucci: Reply to Simona Chiodo 
As explained above in the Précis of the research, I 
suggested to leave Professor Chiodo’s contribution last because 
it raises fundamental problems and various kinds of 
perspectives that exceed at least in part the limits of the 
research I have done so far. 
A first question concerns the way appearances should be 
considered. To see in someone’s face that “something goes 
wrong” can mean, on the one hand, understanding what 
appears as an expression of an emotionally connoted relational 
mode, as one could say by recalling Dewey’s analysis of emotion 
in Art as Experience (for example: Dewey 1987, 48-50 and 70-
76), or as an Abschattung, to recall the analysis of passive 
syntheses carried out by Husserl. In this case, in fact, what 
appears is a complex of “aspects” (in a phenomenological sense) 
in which an experiential interaction unfolds. So “sensing a 
discomfort” means being able to articulate a response capable of 
triggering a manifestation that, within these boundaries, 
results to be shared as a whole. There are relational therapies 
that increase the well-being of patients by leveraging this 
experience-with, as happens with narrative medicine or, more 
fundamentally, in structures that host terminally ill patients. 
Here the disease ceases to be a mere nuclear content to be 
tackled only cognitively (with medical techniques and sciences) 
and becomes again a collusive experiential field. However, it 
would be naive to argue that, in such contexts, the content of 
medical knowledge is set aside or forgotten. Instead, it 
becomes (or perhaps returns to be) operative more than (or 
beyond) being thematic, integrating itself into expressive 
correspondences. 
On the other hand, instead, to see in someone’s face that 
“something goes wrong” can mean considering the appearance a 
mere symptom instead of an aspectual complex. In this case, a 
trait that canonically characterizes the experience-of, that is, 
the contraction of the appearance in the lower form of a 




substantial being that would only be “behind” it, resurfaces. 
This is what we try to delegate to purely formal algorithms and 
protocols, since it is an internal content of experience that can 
be more easily translated into a propositional and judicative 
form. Then, “sensing an aspect” comes to mean performing an 
act of interpretation, not a “perceiving-as”, as Wittgenstein 
would say. Thus, the experiential dynamism of the phenomenon 
is lost and, with it, its aesthetic significance. There is no doubt 
that Western culture, especially as far as its model of 
knowledge is concerned, has tended to privilege this 
experiential mode, and the risk of atrophy underlined by 
Chiodo lies in this, I believe. But it is precisely in this sense 
that I believe that aestheticization also offers an antidote to the 
reduction to quantitative functionalism that is embodied by 
today’s rampant commodification processes. When it is 
aesthetic, the sense of otherness carries an ethical force far 
more compelling than in the simple cognitive acquisition. 
A second issue concerns an underlying humanism that 
inspires Chiodo, but which runs the risk of being regressive. 
The infinite negotiation between qualitative and quantitative 
does not occur independently of the artifice. On the one hand, I 
honestly would not feel reassured just because a diagnosis is 
made by a human being rather than a machine. On the other 
hand, those who work in the field of computer sciences know 
well that artificial intelligence systems are not only 
computational devices. As the phenomenon of deep learning 
shows, more and more elements of qualitative density are 
emerging in the complex processes that artificial devices realize 
with much greater efficacy than human beings, and for reasons 
that will remain unparalleled whatever science Homo sapiens 
will ever be able to acquire. Phenomena of this type could even 
be understood as unexpected cases of experience-with, 
disturbing precisely to the extent that one would rather confine 
the device to a docile experience-of that is cognitively 
controllable. This is almost like saying that humanism moves 
equally in the shadow of mere instrumental knowledge, except 
that it aims ideologically to claim a mythical and residual 
ineffability of the Human. 
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It is not therefore a matter of repudiating algorithms, or 
of contrasting them with “the Human”. Algorithms are also 
ways of making nature human, even in the inhumanity of such 
nature where devices are considered only in terms of their 
quantitative and determinant/determinable performance. They 
are instead configurations that discretize the dense field of 
experience to which they give expression – like any artifice, 
starting from language, of which Plato, not by chance, 
stigmatized the written form. There is a problem only if we rely 
on the fetish of the written word instead of relying on the 
speaking word (possibly even written and anonymous, or even 
mechanical!), so to speak – even as far as algorithms and their 
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